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MANAGEMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES
LEONARD B. DWORSKY, GEORGE R. FRANCIS
and CHARLES F. SWEZEY*
EDITOR'S NOTE
This paper represents the efforts of the Canada-United States
University Seminar. This was a six-month seminar comprised of
faculty members and governmental representativesfrom both Canada
and the United States held from December 1971 to June 1972. The
objective of the seminar was to consider the need for and the
formulation of an improved resource management structure for the
Great Lakes Basin.
Part I of the paper deals with the present situation regarding
resource use problems of the basin, while Part II presents the
conclusions and recommendations of the seminar.
Canada and the United States represent two of the world's leading
advanced industrial societies. These two nations share a 3,500 mile
continuous boundary, but the most important segment of that border
by far is the Great Lakes Basin. It is there that the huge industrial and
population complex of the North-Central United States comes
together with the most industrialized and urbanized region of
Canada. All of the people living and working in the Great Lakes Basin
are, by reason of geography and economic necessity, interdependent,
and they must share both the benefits and the costs of continued
industrial and population growth. It has been demonstrated in recent
years that the other side of the development coin is environmental
degradation, natural resource depletion and land use mismanagement.
One well-known manifestation of this is the deterioration of water
quality. Another set of problems concerns the effective management
of lake levels, water supply, navigation, recreation and hydropower in
and on these joint Canadian and U.S. boundary waters. The heart of
the problem appears to lie in institutional inadequacies on both sides
of the international border. For example, pollution of the waters of
the Great Lakes is a well-studied problem with government concern
going back to 1912; however, the inescapable fact remains that the
problem persists. It would be unfair to say that nothing was done, but
it would be negligence of a high order to assert that enough has been
done.
*Director, Cornell University Water Resources and Marine Sciences Center; Chairman,
Department of Man-Environment Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario; Sr.
Research Aide, Cornell University Water Resources and Marine Sciences Center.
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In 1889 the governments of Mexico and the United States established under treaty a joint commission1 which, after subsequent
changes, became the International Boundary and Water Commission. 2 In 1909 the governments of Great Britain (for Canada) and the
United States signed the Boundary Waters Treaty, and in 1912
Canada and the United States formed the International Joint Commission (IJC) to carry out the purposes of the treaty. 3 Guided by these
international conventions, the countries have managed rivers and
lakes, constructed dams and hydroelectric power facilities, attempted
to control water pollution, exchanged lands affected by changed
water courses, controlled floods and have undertaken other tasks
assigned by the respective concerned governments. There exists,
however, the need to consider the opportunities and problems
associated with the establishment of some form of integrated management of these efforts.
In more specific terms, there is a need at this time to explore ways
to strengthen present institutional relationships and to examine the
nature of a binational body that could serve as the locus of
coordination for the full range of Great Lakes resource management
problems.
PART I
THE RESOURCE USE SITUATION
The Great Lakes cover a total area of about 95,000 square miles
and drain an additional land area of approximately 200,000 square
miles. They rank among the largest bodies of fresh water in the world.
The Great Lakes, lying on or adjacent to the border between the
United States and Canada, are situated in the interior of the continent
of North America. A connected chain, they are drained by the St.
Lawrence River which flows northeast through Quebec province to
the Atlantic Ocean. The Great Lakes Basin lies between the latitudes
of 40'30' and 50'30' north, and between the longitudes of 70'30' and
93o10 ' west, covering a maximum span of 690 miles north-south and
860 miles east-west. The eastern limit of the basin, near the end of
Lake Ontario, is 600 miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean as
1. Convention to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of
November 12, 1884, and to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the Changes Which
Take Place in Beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado River, Mar. 1, 1889 [1890], 26 Stat. 1512, T.
S. 232.
2. Convention on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944 [1945], art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 944.
3. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Between
the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909 [1910], art. vii, 37 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. 548.
[hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
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measured along the St. Lawrence River. The western end of the
basin, near the west end of Lake Superior, is nearly halfway across the
continent from the Atlantic. Fifty-nine percent of the Great Lakes
Basin is in the United States and the remaining 41% is in Canada,
covering parts of eight states but only one province, Ontario.
The water and land resources of the Great Lakes Basin have
encouraged people and industry to locate in the region. It is here that
the huge industrial and population complex of the north-central
United States joins the most industrialized and urbanized region of
Canada. The basin as a whole has a present population of 36 million
which is expected to exceed 60 million by the end of this century.
Demographers see the region as an emerging international megalopolis which by the year 2000 is projected to contain over a 4third of the
Canadian population and a quarter of the U.S. population.
The effects of past population and industrial growth in the Great
Lakes Basin on that region's water and related land resources are
well documented. There are serious water pollution problems in
Lakes Michigan, Erie and Ontario; air pollution concerns in the
Detroit-Windsor area and on the Niagara Frontier; fishery resource
depletion; and numerous land use mismanagement and other resource
management problems not necessary to detail here. These population
and industrialization pressures on the limited resources of the basin
are increasing at an accelerating rate. Municipalities use the region's
water for dilution of waste, nuclear power plants propose to use lake
water as a coolant for their reactors, and millions of people use the
water environment for recreation. Shipping is dependent upon water,
and fish and wildlife require a natural ecosystem of which water is an
essential part.
The present proliferation and expansion of these uses are putting
considerable stresses on the physical limits of the water system of the
basin. Furthermore, many of these uses conflict not only with the
limitations of the resource, but also with other uses.
The water resource management problems of the Great Lakes
include matters related to water quality; municipal and industrial
water supply; irrigation; lake level control; hydropower; flood
control; navigation; shoreline protection and development; fish and
wildlife protection; water based recreation; solid waste disposal; air
quality; and urban and industrial land use. While these problems are
discrete, they also interact. For example, lake levels affect directly
but in different ways hydropower, flood control, navigation and
shoreline property use. Improperly treated municipal and industrial
4. See J. Pickard, Metropolitanization of the United States (1959); see also Pickard, Is
MegalopolisInevitable? 4 The Futurist (1970).
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wastewater adversely affect drinking water supplies, fisheries and
recreational opportunities. In addition, there are related land and
economic development issues, especially those affecting shoreline
development, that are of fundamental importance to the effective
management of the water resource base.
These systemic interrelationships notwithstanding, governments at
all levels in both countries continue to treat these water problems as
separate situations. Each of these major resource use areas has its own
special cluster of public agencies and private organizations defending
and promoting one use over the others. A competitive, special interest
milieu exists in which different users of the same resource often find
themselves working at cross purposes. In such a setting, public policy
decisions on competing water and land uses are seldom made using
some measure of net social benefit as the main criterion. In the Great
Lakes the situation is further complicated by the fact that the waters
are, to a large extent, binational.
As a way of illustrating the current resource use situation in the
Great Lakes Basin, five problem areas are briefly surveyed.
WATER QUALITY
Lake Erie, the western end of Lake Ontario and the southern end of
Lake Michigan suffer from pollution in almost all its forms. The
problem is by now well researched and publicized. Furthermore, the
problem of water degradation is not a new one. In the period
1912-1918, there was concern by the federal authorities in the United
States over Great Lakes pollution and infected water sources as they
affected the spread of typhoid fever. Government interest quickly
faded, however, when that disease was brought under control by
drinking water purification processes and other advances in sanitary
engineering. It was not until 1964 that the Canadian and United
States Governments moved to investigate in an adequate way
pollution in the lower Great Lakes and the international section of
the St. Lawrence River. 5 The corrective measures recommended in
that intensive study are only now being implemented, and correction
of the situation will require considerable time.
The basic causes of the serious water quality problems of the Great
Lakes are the same as those of other regions. They include reluctance
of the federal governments to interfere in an area reserved by
5. Request of October 7, 1964, I.C.J. 83. The Court requested the Commission to undertake
a study of water pollution in Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of the St.
Lawrence River and to recommend practicable remedial measures. Appropriate technical
boards were formed and a report was submitted to the International Court of Justice in 1969.

January 19741

MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT LAKES

107

tradition to the states and the provinces; inadequate enforcement
authority (and lack of will to enforce) on the part of the federal and
state/provincial pollution control agencies; a fragmented bureaucracy for regional planning and natural resources management; lack
of funds; excessive number of political jurisdictions with overlapping
authorities and responsibilities; and a lack of precedent and experience in area wide waste treatment management planning. This list is
not complete, but it includes the more important obstacles to an
integrated approach.
In the Great Lakes region an additional obstacle is encountered.
The Great Lakes are shared (except for Lake Michigan) between two
countries and this fact tends to inhibit joint, comprehensive efforts
whether they be research undertakings, resource planning or clean-up
of polluted air and water. This inhibitive effect is not a permanent
obstacle, but rather a variable factor inversely related to the
determination of both countries to cooperate on the Great Lakes. In
view of recent events (the 1972 Agreement between Canada and the
United. States), the prospects for meaningful cooperation on
transboundary water pollution between the United States and Canada
have improved substantially.
The heart of the problem appears to lie in institutional inadequacies on both sides of the international border. While in recent
years policy makers and technical agencies in Canada and in the
United States have made visible progress in improving the management of water, land and environmental quality in the Great Lakes
Basin, unfortunately, the effect of this effort is something less than it
could have been, simply because of the dampening effects of the
existing fragmented institutional structure.
FISH AND WILDLIFE
Concern over declining fish populations predates even the early,
albeit transitory, interest in water pollution. No less than 27
commissions and conferences since 1875 arrived at the same general
conclusion that little progress would be made in halting the decline of
fish populations in the Great Lakes until the fisheries were subjected
to uniform federal and international control. 6 In 1955 the two nations
established under treaty the Great Lakes Fishery Commission. 7 The
commission was created primarily as a response to the sea lamprey
6. Report to the InternationalBoard of Inquiry of the United States and Canada,44 Science
10(1944).
7. Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, September 10, 1954 [1955], art. II, 6 UST 2836,
TIAS 3326.
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problem. Its broader stated objective is to improve the quality,
abundance and productivity of the fishery resources of the Great
Lakes for sport and commercial use.
While the commission has had considerable success in controlling
the sea lamprey, neither the treaty nor the commission has proved
adequate in dealing with the problems of habitat destruction on a
large scale or of the malevolent effects of pollution. Perhaps the major
question facing fish and wildlife management in the Great Lakes
Basin is how they may be protected against encroachment by
competing and conflicting uses of the lakes' environment. One
example is the location of thermal power plants and the effects that
heat discharges have on aquatic life. Another example is the current
high demand for wetlands, particularly near urban areas, as sites for
construction projects or solid waste disposal areas. Accelerated
eutrophication of wetlands caused by man can eventually destroy
them as nesting areas for waterfowl.
The basic deficiency in fishery management of the Great Lakes is
that the responsible public agencies are restricted to limited and
narrowly defined roles. Stronger public agencies working under
internationally agreed standards and objectives are required if the two
countries are to achieve effective fish and wildlife management in the
Great Lakes Basin.
LAKE LEVEL CONTROL
With their vast drainage area of 295,000 square miles, a third of
which is water surface area, the Great Lakes provide one of the best
naturally regulated systems of fresh water in the world. This is
demonstrated by the narrow range of variations in levels and outflows
experienced prior to the advent of any artificial regulation on the
lakes. The present ranges for monthly mean levels vary from 4.0 feet
in Lake Superior to 6.6 feet in Lake Ontario. These are long-term
averages, however, and they do not reflect periodic aberrations of
high water (1951-1952) and low water (1964) which can and did have
serious adverse effects on certain water users. High water during the
winter of 1972-1973 is again creating concern along the lake shores.
During these episodes, unusual pressures are directed at public
authorities to investigate the feasibility of further reducing lake level
fluctuations by constructing adjustable control works to regulate
outflows or by diverting water to or from areas outside of the Great
Lakes Basin. As a result of concerted efforts by many interests in both
countries, the governments of Canada and the United States in 1964
requested the International Joint Commission to undertake a com-
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plete study of lake levels and their possible control.8 The IJC study on
lake levels is nearing completion and the report is reportedly
scheduled to be issued in late 1973.
The interests affected by variations in the levels and outflows of the
Great Lakes are considered in three general categories: the shore
property interests; the navigation interests; and the power interests.
Shore property interests are all public and private lands and
developments along the shorelines. It includes, among other things,
cottages, water recreation activities, domestic water supply and
sanitation, port facilities and industrial cooling water supplies.
Shoreline interests are benefited by a reduction in the range of stage
since they are adversely affected by extremes of both high and low
levels. Navigation interests comprehend the water problems of
commercial shipping on and through the lakes and connecting
channels and include the related problems of recreational boating.
Generally, navigation is served best by high lake levels. Hydropower
interests are benefited by high water levels which help to ensure
maintenance of minimum flows as large as possible.
Under the most favorable conditions, lake level regulation rules
cannot ensure that each water user throughout the system obtains the
levels and flows best suited to his particular needs. However, rules are
conceivable that would provide levels and flows that would result in
generally beneficial conditions without unacceptable adverse effects
to any interest. 9
The whole matter of regulation of the levels and outflows of the
Great Lakes cannot be other than international. Artificial control
within the lakes of the water supply which comes from both countries
cannot be undertaken without affecting the water use interests on
either side of the international boundary. Changes in outflows and
levels will, of course, have similar international effects. The binational nature of lake levels and their effects was formally recognized
in the 1909 Boundary Water Treaty with its specific injunctions
against unilateral diversions and obstructions of boundary waters
(Articles II through V).
8. Request of October 7, 1964, I.C.J. 82. The Court requested the Commission
to determine whether measures within the Great Lakes Basin can be taken in the
public interest to regulate further the levels of the Great Lakes or any of them
and their connecting waters so as to reduce the extremes of stages. . . experienced.
The International Great Lakes Levels Board was established; a final report is expected to be
issued in late 1973.
9. T. Patterson & H. Lawhead, History and Present Status of Regulation and Regulation
Studies of Water Levels and Flows on the GreatLakes, in proceedings of the Great Lakes Water
Resources Conference 217 (1968).
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NAVIGATION
Waterborne commercial traffic on the Great Lakes has been a
significant factor in the economic development of the region.
Low cost water transportation, coupled with the availability of
adequate supplies of ore, coal, water and electric power, have been
decisive considerations in the location of such primary industries as
the steel mills on Lakes Michigan, Erie and Ontario. The major
present concern of navigation interests in the basin relates to the
modernization and improvement of this important industry.
A construction program is underway in Canada to make improvements on the Welland Canal and navigation channels of the St.
Lawrence River. A new $180 million 8-mile section in the Welland
Canal which bypasses the City of Welland is scheduled to be opened
in 1973.10 The United States has had under study for a number of
years a U.S. canal linking Lake Erie with Lake Ontario as a means of
handling the anticipated increases in waterborne traffic in future
years.
Shipping interests of the Great Lakes of both countries consider an
extension of the present 250-260 day navigation season 1 1 on the Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway absolutely vital to the system's long term
viability and prospects for growth. The U.S. Congress in 1970
authorized a $6.5 million, 3-year, interagency study and demonstration project to determine the feasibility of extending the seaway
season to a full twelve months. 12 The results of this program thus far
have indicated that an increase of one month in the shipping season is
not an unrealistic goal.
Safety and pollution control are additional concerns of shipping
interests and the regulatory public agencies. Dredging operations to
facilitate shipping have produced problems of spoil deposition,
hydrologic change and modification of aquatic habitats. Control and
enforcement authority available to deal with these problems under
the water pollution control laws of both countries was, until quite
recently, complicated, time consuming and, on the whole, ineffective.
The enforcement measures under the provisions of the U.S. Federal
Water Pollution Control Act as amended in 1972, and the recently
strengthened measures in Canada, provide improved opportunities for
10. Interview with D. W. Oberlin, Seaway Administrator, 3 Seaway Rev. 5 (1972).
11. The present operating dates for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system are April
1-December 15, with some annual variation, depending on climatic conditions. The 1971 season
was the longest on record, running from April 1, 1971 into February 1972.
12. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 107. The Winter Navigation
Demonstration Program is being conducted by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers as lead
agency in an organization of ten federal agencies comprising the Winter Navigation Board.
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these aspects of water pollution control, but they are not yet fully
tested. 13
Changes in lake biology have resulted from waterway development. The most notable of these changes was the introduction of the
sea lamprey into Lake Erie and the upper lakes after completion of
the Welland Canal. The canal also permitted the alewife to circum14
vent Niagara Falls and enter the upper lakes.
User charges have been an issue of major importance in the
15
management of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway facilities.
The seaway is the only navigation works in the continental United
States for which users are charged fees. The fee schedule in effect
since the opening of the seaway in June 1959 sets a base toll of 4 cents
per ton plus $.40 per ton for bulk cargo and $.90 per ton for general
cargo (no charge is currently made for tonnage in transit). This
original toll accord between Canada and the United States expired in
1966, touching off a vigorous debate. Atlantic and Gulf coast interests
pushed for toll increases for the seaway while Great Lakes interests
proposed a decrease or even elimination, claiming that the tolls
represented a discriminatory burden on the economies of the Midwest. The proponents of a toll increase based their arguments on the
fact that during the first several years of operation, tonnage volume
moving through the seaway system was considerably below original
(and overly optimistic) expectations, consequently, debt repayment
failed to keep pace with the imposed repayment schedule. Great
Lakes shippers, on the other hand, claim that it is not at all certain
that toll increases would in fact raise revenues. The Canadian
government, which financed 71 percent of the original seaway
construction, bears a correspondingly larger share of the long term
debt and thus favors a modification of the toll accords to allow
increases in user fees at both the St. Lawrence and Welland locks.
Great Lakes shippers of both countries maintain opposition to
increases, arguing that current tolls already constitute a substantial
portion (around 20 percent) of their costs. The issue over tolls was
ameliorated, at least temporarily, when the U.S. Congress passed the
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). In
Canada, The Federal Canada Water Act of 1970 which provides an important mechanism for
joint efforts in inter-provincial and binational water management programs; The Federal
Fisheries Act Amendments of 1970 which authorize the setting of national effluent standards for
all industries discharging wastes into waters inhabited by fish.
14. S. Smith, Species Succession and Fishery Exploitation in the Great Lakes, Journal of the
Fishery Research Board of Canada 667-693 (1968).
15. The discussion on user charges of the St. Lawrence Seaway system is taken from E.
Shenker & J. Wilson, The First 7 years of the St. Lawrence Seaway (1966), reprinted in 112
Cong. Rec. 24661 (1966).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

Merchant Marine Act of 1970, which, among other things, relieved
the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (U.S.) from
payment of accrued as well as future interest charges on the principal
debt of the U.S. section of the seaway. 16 A favorable trend for the
seaway system is the steadily increasing use of the waterway. Gross
tonnage in 1971 rose to 53 million short tons, compared with the
17
estimated break even point of 42 million short tons per season.
Nonetheless, the toll issue remains, and the mechanism that would be
used in resolving this difficult problem has not yet been devised.
URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL LAND USE
In the context of this brief discussion, "urban and industrial land
use" refers primarily to the effects of urban development and
industrial development on the use of the land resources of the Great
Lakes Basin. It goes almost without saying that the basic economic
issue that must be confronted by the people of the Great Lakes region
is how best to allocate the available water and land resources among
competing uses and to resolve the inevitable conflicts that arise as
growth pressures continue to increase in the region.
Water uses are interrelated. The allocation of water, and indeed
related land resources as well, involves a continuous series of
trade offs which seek to meet agreed on social objectives while
reducing conflict. Economic factors play a central role in this process.
They provide a major mechanism for working toward some mix of
resource allocation which, theoretically at least, will provide the
maximum level of possible benefits for the most people. There are
great problems associated with achieving these objectives through
economic processes alone. Political, social and institutional factors
impinge on and influence public decision making processes, which,
more often than not, produce something far less than the optimal
economic solution to public problems. Another source of suboptimization in a purely economic sense is the inherent problem of quantifying
all costs and benefits associated with the selection of alternatives.
Finally, there is the problem of externalities-the measurement,
allocation and management of costs or benefits-which are not
comprehended in the traditional economic and political processes.
Much of the current concerns over the "environment" are in
recognition of this.
In spite of the difficulties involved, the problems created by
competing demands on finite public resources must be confronted
economically. They must be dealt with both in terms of external
16. Merchant Marine Act of 1970, §43, 84 Stat. 1018 (1970).
17. Shenker & Wilson, supra note 15, at 24661.
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diseconomies as well as classical notions of costs. Consideration should
be given to ways of introducing into the calculus of economic
trade off and compromise a much higher level of non-market
influence in order to protect the interests of all sectors of the society.
Natural resources and their allocation should not be the exclusive
concern of those particular groups possessing the economic and
political clout to exclude other sectors of society. The increasing use
of the courts, particularly in the United States in response to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,18 has yielded some visible
progress in restraining uncontrolled exploitation of our key resources
or unique places of natural beauty. It is a constant struggle, and one
destined to become even harder fought in the future.
For all intents and purposes, economic development occurs in both
countries in response to market forces, limited in the most nominal
sense and in only some cases by government regulatory agencies.
Planned economic development as such does not exist. Neither
Canada nor the United States subscribes to any concept of a planned
economy. Both countries, however, have evolved some legislative
tools (e.g., Employment Act of 194619) and institutional devices (e.g.,
Council of Economic Advisors in the U.S. or the Economic Council of
Canada) to guide their respective economies along certain general
lines, such as increased and sustained economic growth. Increasing
Gross National Product, minimizing unemployment and controlling
inflation make up the essential elements of our respective national
economic policies. The states and provinces simply endorse this
growth policy as the generally accepted economic goal.
While most urban development still takes place without benefit of
effective planning, a widespread planning institutional base has been
established in both Canada and the United States. Recent legislative
activity in the U.S. proposes stronger government land control
policies, and this issue is becoming more urgent in Ontario largely as
a result of the urbanization in the lower Great Lakes. There are some
good instances of land use planning at the municipal level, for
example, the Toronto Centred Region2 0 and comparable regional
studies by the Province of Ontario. Land use planning experience in
the United States has been strengthened by programs in Hawaii 21
(Land Use Commission), Vermont 22 (Environmental Control Law and
18. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
19. Employment Act of 1946, as amended, 60 Stat. 23 (1946).
20. Government of Ontario, Design for Development: The Toronto-Centered Region (1970).
This report was part of a larger land use analysis and planning program for Ontario known as
Design for Development initiated in April 1966 by the Government of Ontario.
21. Hawaii Rev. Laws. §205 (Supp. 1969) (Land Use Commission).
22. Environmental Control Law of 1970, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §151 (1970)
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Environmental Board), Wisconsin 23 (shoreland protection program
Act of 1966) and in New York State
under the state Water Resources
24
(Agricultural Districts).
In the Great Lakes Basin, a number of contradictory trends can be
seen. One is the past, and perhaps even present, trend toward the
increasing misuse of air and water for waste disposal. At the same
time there is a rapidly increasing demand for water of improved
quality for a host of urban needs and also for the health and aesthetics
of recreation. There is an increasing desire to use the shoreline for
recreational purposes, yet simultaneously in the same areas, there are
pressures to build over it all, for industrial and urban development.
There are increasing demands to use the Great Lakes for a major
shipping route; to use more of the water for industry, for irrigation
and for power station cooling; to use more of the water for waste
disposal; and to use more of the shore for more complex uses. In short,
we are imposing on the Great Lakes a great number of intensely
conflicting demands. This situation calls for a very complex and
careful devised planning system in both countries which together
must deal with the total basin.
Development planning on a joint basis is now a prerequisite to
intelligent and efficient management of the resources of the Great
Lakes Basin. This does not mean that Canada and the United States
need to march in lockstep. It would suffice if they could be persuaded
that the mutual interest is best served by proceeding in cooperation to
correct the present wasteful and uncontrolled manner in which the
resources of the basin are used.
The only existing formal arrangement between the United States
and Canada broad enough in scope to permit comprehensive joint
action on resource use problems of the Great Lakes Basin is the
International Joint Commission (IJC). 25 The Commission was formed
in 191226 to carry out the purposes of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
to prevent disputes regarding the
January 11, 1909, which are: "...
23. Wisconsin Shoreland Zoning Law, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1970).
24. Laws of New York, 1971, Vol. 1, Ch. 479. This Act provides for the creation of
agricultural districts to carry out the declared policy of the state to conserve and protect
agricultural lands from the pressures of urbanization. See F. Bosselman & D. Callies, The Quiet
Revolution in Land Use Control (1971).
25. The other existing Canada-United States treaty body, the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, established pursuant to the 1954 Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (supra note
7), has a more specialized mandate, to wit: implementation of a program to control the sea
lamprey and the formation and coordination of research programs designed to improve the
fisheries.
26. Both Governments had appointed their respective members by November 10, 1911; the
Commission held its organizational session in January 1912 and its first regular meeting on April
13, 1913. See 49 Cong. Rec. 3123 (1913).
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use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are now
pending between the United States and the Dominion of Canada
involving the rights, obligations or interests of either . . . along their
common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and
settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise . . ."27
The commission consists of six members, three from each country.
The United States Commissioners are appointed by and serve at the
pleasure of the President.2 8 The appointment of U.S. Commissioners
is not subject to Senate confirmation. 29 The Canadian Commissioners
are appointed by Order in Council of the Canadian Government and
0
serve at the pleasure of the government. 3
The 1909 Treaty gives the Commission responsibility in two
general categories. The first of these responsibilities is to approve or
disapprove all proposals for use, obstruction or diversion of boundary
waters on either side of the boundary which would affect the natural
level or flow of the boundary waters on the other side. Examples in
the Great Lakes system include the regulating works at Saulte Ste.
Marie, those on the St. Lawrence River, as well as numerous private
dams constructed by industrial firms that might affect the natural
state of the boundary waters. These projects are brought before the
IJC by what are termed "applications,- 31 filed by interested public
agencies or private corporations or individuals.
The second general responsibility, which is becoming the major
work of the Commission, is to investigate and make recommendations
on specific problems referred to it by either or both governments. 32 It
is under this provision of the treaty that requests, or "references," by
the two governments have been made on such varied subjects as
water pollution, air pollution, regulation of the levels of the Great
Lakes, preservation of the American Falls at Niagara and others.
In the case of an application, the burden is on the applicant to
furnish all necessary information and data required. Interested
persons may intervene in support of or in opposition to the
application. This is followed by public hearings usually on both sides
of the boundary, after which the Commission issues a final order
concerning the proposed project. 33
In the case of references, the procedure is different. The Commission appoints an international technical board which is directed to
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Convention, supra note 2, at preamble.
See Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VII.
Id. Articles VII does not require the advice and consent of the Senate.
Id.
See Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. III & IV.
Id. at art. IX.
Id. at art. VIII.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

make a thorough investigation of the facts involved and file a written
report with the Commission. The IJC then publishes the board report
and schedules public hearings. The Commission then prepares its
is bound by the
report to the two governments. Neither government
34
reports or recommendations of the Commission.
As of December 1972, the Commission had docketed a total of 95
actions, including 58 applications and 37 references. 35 Of that total,
26 actions pertained in some way to the water, land or air resources of
the Great Lakes Basin.
The Commission carries out its varied responsibilities through a
series of permanent and ad hoc boards. As of December 1972, the
Commission had under it thirteen boards of control, seven boards of
investigation and eight surveillance boards. This does not include the
new Great Lakes Water Quality Board established by the Commission
pursuant to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement signed by the
two countries in April 1972.36 The Water Quality Board will be the
carry out its role in
instrument through which the Commission will
37
controlling water pollution in the Great Lakes.
The International Joint Commission has been in existence for
sixty-one years. It was originally conceived and promoted as a
bilateral, quasi-judicial body to provide speedy and efficient resolution of those occasional and mainly minor border disputes that arose
among citizens of Canada and the United States and which were,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of both countries.
Prior to the formation of the Commission, referral of such disputes to
the Department of State or to the British Government more often
than not led to lengthy diplomatic correspondence between
Washington and London. Excessive delays and presumed bureaucratic
inaction tended to feed suspicions and arouse national feelings to the
point that minor border controversies were blown far out of proportion to their actual importance. In short, the drafters of the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty sought to create an instrumentality that
could help prevent boundary controversies as well as resolve with
minimum delay any that did arise.
The Commission has accomplished its purpose in a commendable
manner. Its long life cannot be explained by the conventional wisdom
concerning the tendency of temporary commissions and boards to
acquire permanent stature. The primary reason the Commission has
34. Id. at art. IX.
35. Information provided by U. S. Section, I.C.J. (December 1972).
36. Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water
Quality, signed in Ottawa on April 15, 1972 and in force on April 15, 1972.
37. Id., art VII.
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endured is the simple fact that the need for which it was designed has
itself persisted.
There has been only one instance in its sixty year life that the
Commission and its reason for being were challenged in the U.S.
Congress. The first and only serious discussion in the United States
Senate to consider terminating the treaty took place on February 27,
1913 when a doubting and impatient Senator Borah asked why the
Commission had "made no report and consummated nothing in the
way of final settlement." The reply to Senator Borah was made by
Senator Elihu Root, who in 1909 signed the Boundary Waters Treaty
as Secretary of State. Root strongly defended the Commission and its
intended purpose. Regarding the need for it over the long term, he
said:
I do not anticipate that the time will ever come when this
commission will not be needed. I think that as the two countries
along this tremendous boundary line become more and more
thickly settled, the need for it will increase. I do not think we shall
ever see the time when this commission will not be needed to
dispose of controversies along the boundary line in their inception, furnishing a machinery ready at hand for people to get relief
and redress without going into the long process of diplomatic
correspondence. I think it will have to continue as long as the
ordinary courts of the country continue. 38
These and other remarks made that day on the floor of the Senate
by Elihu Root closed the only discussion thas has taken place in the
U.S. Congress that might have led to the termination of the 1909
Treaty on the part of the United States. 39
Aside from its longevity and its record of serving its intended
purpose, the IJC is unique in other ways. One of these is its
impartiality. The philosophy of the original negotiators of the treaty
was that problems between the two countries were to be resolved
"not by the usual bilateral negotiation, but in the joint deliberations
of a permanent tribunal composed equally of Canadians and Americans. ' ' 40 There was to be majority rule, irrespective of nationality.
The Commission has an impressive record of honoring this concept.
According to Matthew E. Welsh, former Chairman of the United
States Section (1966-1970), the Commission up through 1969 had
divided along national lines or failed to reach unanimous agreement
38. 49 Cong. Rec. 4172 (1913).
39. Art. XIV of the Treaty declared that it "shall remain in force for five years, dating from
the day of exchange of ratifications (May 10, 1910), and thereafter until terminated by twelve
months' written notice given by either High Contracting Party to the other.
40. MacCallum, The InternationalJoint Commission, 72 Canadian Geographical J. 2 (1966).
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in only three decisions
out of the ninety-odd docket cases submitted to
41
the commission.
This tradition Of impartiality is a valuable asset to the Commission.
It should be protected and nurtured in the present context, and it
should be emulated by any future joint organization which may be
established by the two countries.
Another positive aspect of the Commission is its reputation for
being nonpolitical. While it is true that commissioners are appointed
and serve at the pleasure of their respective governments, and that
some appointments have been terminated to make room for individuals considered more qualified by the particular administration in
power, this is about as far as the political process intervenes in the
functioning of the IJC. It has not been the practice of either country
to appoint, as a matter of course, new commissioners whenever a new
government is formed. The relative absence of partisan politics within
the IJC has not only facilitated its work, but it has also enhanced its
overall credibility and reputation.
Another feature of the Commission is the modest size of the
permanent staff and operating budget of both the U.S. and Canadian
sections. The size of the full time staff of the U.S. section has
remained virtually constant at five persons since 1913,42 and the
administrative budget has increased from $42,000 in FY 19144:3 to
about $300,000 in FY 1973. 44 This amount has remained essentially
constant, when the effects of inflation over the intervening years are
taken into account. The Canadian section has also remained small,
and currently consists of eight persons, including one Commissioner
on a full time basis.
As a result of the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the
IJC will undergo an expansion of its permanent staff. The U.S. section
plans to increase its Washington staff to approximately five professionals. The newly authorized regional office is located at Windsor,
Ontario. It will have a staff of sixteen, including ten professionals, five
45
from each country.
The IJC was originally conceived and created by treaty as a court
of arbitration. Like any court, the IJC assumes a passive role. It lacks
authority to act until either (1) an application for approval of works or
41. Heeney, Along the Common Frontier:The InternationalJoint Commission, 26 Canadian
Institute of Int'l. Affairs 7 (1967); M. Welsh, The Work of the International Joint Commission
reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 25032 (1969).
42. The permanent staff of the U. S. Section in mid-1972 consisted of one full time Chairman
and two part time commissioners; an Executive Director; a Secretary and two secretaries.

43. 49 Cong. Rec. 4175 (1913).
44. Information provided by U. S. Section, I.C.J. (July 1972).
45. Id. (December 1972).
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(2) a reference from one or both governments is received. Its
holdings ("orders") with regard to applications are final, having the
force of law in both countries. On the other hand, in the case of a
reference, its role is much more limited. Upon receipt of a reference,
the Commission will temporarily assume investigative, administrative
and recommendatory functions which are specified by the terms of
the reference. When an investigation has been completed, the IJC
makes recommendations to the governments. There is nothing in the
treaty requiring either country to act upon such recommendations.
In recent years, the number of applications received by the
Commission has diminished, while the references submitted to the
Commission have tended to increase. The IJC finds itself more and
more in the role of coordinating large scale joint studies (water
pollution of the Great Lakes, 1964-1969 and lake levels, 1964-1973)
and of making recommendations thereon to the two governments.
The IJC is reactive as opposed to initiatory. Its principal tasks, once
the organization is set in motion, are coordinative and recommendatory. Its present form and modus operandi are faithful reflections of
the carefully written provisions of the 1909 Treaty.
The IJC was not granted a planning role with respect to the
boundary waters by the treaty. Thus the Commission has neither the
authority nor the resources with which to undertake a planning
function, much less to develop a program designed to attack the
mismanagement of the boundary waters. Its contribution has been the
resolution of problems on a case-by-case basis as they arose and as
they captured sufficient federal government attention to result in the
required reference.
It is sometimes asserted that the IJC need not maintain a large
technical staff to carry out the investigations authorized by reference,
since it can draw upon the federal agencies of both countries for these
purposes. 46 This is a situation not without its drawbacks. When the
technical work of the Commission is carried out by the federal
agencies of the two governments, and this by necessity has always
been the case, the work produced is a product of the priorities,
constraints, funding and program biases of the participating agencies.
While the Commission, at the onset of an investigation, has and
exercises authority to mark out the scope and terms of the project,
this power tends to dissipate in an irreversible manner once the
project is firmly in the hands of the technical agencies. Since the
Commission has no fiscal control or continuous supervisory control
46. M. Welsh, & A. Heeney, InternationalJoint Connmission: United States and Canada, a
paper presented at the International Conference on Water for Peace, May 23-31, 1967,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.
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over the work done in its name by the agencies, it can do little more
than place its imprimatur on whatever the agencies come up with,
whenever they come up with it.
Notwithstanding its sixty-year existence, the Commission and its
work are virtually unknown to the general public in the United States
and Canada. For many years the Commission's primary function was
the processing of applications for projects involving private parties or
at best very local interests. The Commission quietly and effectively
carried out its treaty mandate in this regard. The fact that the
Commission has seldom if ever gained national attention on either
side of the international border cannot be regarded as a reflection on
the Commission. Success in international problem-solving is measured
just as much by what does not take place as what does. Indeed, an
argument could be made that the low profile of the Commission has
been one of its strengths.
Its lack of public visibility to date notwithstanding, it may be
presumed that that era in the life of the commission is now ending.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement will, if it is vigorously
implemented, thrust the IJC into public view and the political arena
to an unprecedented degree. As the Commission assumes greater
responsibilities, its politicization has to increase, a phenomenon that
will significantly alter both the character of that body and its
operational relationships with those agencies and organizations with
which the Commission has customarily done business. It has been
suggested that a more politicized IJC might actually enhance its
usefulness, since a politically responsive Commission might be trusted
47
with regulatory or enforcement powers.
Interest in the pollution of the Great Lakes antedated the Treaty of
1909. Typhoid fever at the turn of the century ranked as one of the
major health problems in the United States and Canada. The link
between polluted water supplies and the spread of typhoid fever had
been established in Berlin in 1895 and in Scranton, Pennsylvania in
1907. These and other breakthroughs in bacteriology stimulated
governmental epidemiological investigations of typhoid fever of
which the one carried out by Lumsden of the U.S. Public Health
Service (1906-1910) was the most outstanding.
Stream and lake surveys were indicated but the federal agencies
had no legislative authority to undertake them until the passage of the
Public Health Service Act of 1912. The states and provinces had
exclusive jurisdiction over the waterways, and the initiative had to
emanate from that level. In 1908, at the recommendation of the
47. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-CanadianEnvironmental Cooperation, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 469, 550 (1972).
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Mayor of Chicago, an interstate commission to study and report on
pollution in Lake Michigan was formed. The cooperation of the
Public Health Service was requested, and the service responded.
Later that year a similar group composed of representatives of cities
ol Lake Erie was organized to collect data, "and excite interest
regarding the necessity of protecting water supplies." The findings of
both groups pointed to the need for legislation to prevent pollution of
interstate waters. Such legislation was introduced in the Congress, but
was not enacted.
Public and governmental concern over the relationship between
typhoid fever and polluted water supplies found expression in the
1909 Treaty in the form of a single sentence appended to Article IV:
It is hereby agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be
polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the
other.
Any ideas of a prompt contribution by the newly authorized
Commission to the need for a joint survey of the boundary water
pollution problem were dashed by the three year period required to
ready the Commission for business. Even if the IJC had been prepared
to function earlier, a reference on Great Lakes pollution would have

been an empty gesture considering the fact that, on the United States
side, no federal agency had, at least until August 1912, either
legislative authority or the funds to engage in investigations of
pollution in the nation's waterways. 48
On August 14, 1912, Congress enacted the first law directly aimed
at the problem of water pollution by authorizing the Public Health
Service to investigate "the diseases of man and conditions influencing
the propagation and spread thereof, including sanitation and sewage
and the pollution, either directly or indirectly, of the navigable
streams and lakes of the United States." In 1913, the first special
appropriation for field investigations by the Public Health Service was
made by Congress.
In another action in August 1912, the governments of the United
States and Canada sent the IJC a reference (Docket 4) requesting the
Commission to examine:
48. In actuality, however, stream pollution investigations date from 1910 when Dr.Allan J.
McLaughlin of the U. S. Public Health Service was detailed to carry out a survey of cities in the
Great Lakes Basin, with instructions to investigate the extent of pollution of their water supplies
and its relationship to the prevalence of typhoid fever and other waterborne diseases. Those
studies (1910-1911) revealed the correspondence between typhoid fever rates and sewage
polluted drinking water supplies taken from lake waters. See R. Williams The United States
Public Health Service, 1798-1950, 421 (1951).
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1. To what extent and by what causes and in what localities
have the boundary waters between the United States and Canada
been polluted so as to be injurious to the public health and unfit
for domestic or other uses?
2. In what way or manner-is it possible and advisable to
remedy or prevent the pollution of these waters-to fulfill the
obligations undertaken in Article 4 of the waterways treaty of
January 11, 1909-?
At a meeting in Ottawa in October 1912, the new reference was
considered, and it was decided to request clarification as to the
intended scope of the investigation. The response from the Department of State on behalf of both contracting parties in November 1912
confined the investigation "to cases of pollution of boundary waters on
one side of the boundary which extend to and affect the boundary
waters upon the other side."
The Commission secured the services of Dr. McLaughlin of the
PHS and T. A. Starkey of McGill University to lead the investigation.
Professor Earle B. Phelps, an eminent sanitary engineer from
Columbia University, was hired as a consulting engineer. This highly
competent team began its investigation in March 1913. The survey
centered around the connecting channels, but some deepwater
investigations were made with the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The comprehensive reports of Dr. McLaughlin (January 16, 1914) and
Prof. Phelps (March 16, 1916) on their findings, which still stand as
classics in the field of water pollution examination and control,
described a generally unsatisfactory situation. Vivid language was
used such as:
-situation along the frontier which is generally chaotic,
49
everywhere perilous and in some cases disgraceful.
-imperil the health and welfare of the citizens-in substantial
50
contravention of the spirit of the TreatySewage from vessels, cities and industries was identified as the
major cause of pollution. Remedies could be provided by treatment
plants.
The commission issued its final report on August 12, 1918, with the
recommendation that it be granted "ample jurisdiction to regulate
and prohibit this pollution of boundary waters and waters crossing the
boundary." 51 The two governments requested the Commission on
March 11, 1919, to draft either reciprocal legislation or a treaty to
49. I.C.J. Final Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters Reference 31 (1918).
50, Id.,
at 51.
51. Id.
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carry out its recommendations. On October 6, 1920, the Commission
submitted a draft convention which would have given it authority to
investigate any alleged violation of Article IV of the Treaty. In
addition, its findings of fact were to be "final and conclusive" and the
two governments would have been obligated to prevent a continuation of the breach. The proposed convention was never negotiated
to a conclusion. Aside from the obvious concern over vesting the
Commission with such broad powers, there was a reluctance on the
part of both federal governments to legislate in an area in which the
provinces and the states had exercised full jurisdiction. 52 By 1920 the
stance of inaction with regard to the proposed convention was a
defensible one (albeit myopic), because by then the widespread
acceptance of water supply filtration and chlorination had effectively
eliminated typhoid fever as a menace to public health.
The next activity of the Commission concerning boundary water
pollution came much later. On April 1, 1946, a reference, similar in
wording to its 1912 predecessor, was sent to the Commission to cover
the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River. 53 In October
1946, the reference was extended to include the St. Mary's River and
54
in April 1948 was further amended to include the Niagara River.
The IJC carried out an investigation and issued its report in October
1950. The report recommended adoption by the two governments of
water quality objectives as criteria to control water quality. 55 The

two governments approved the recommendations, which authorized
the Commission to establish and maintain continuing supervision over
pollution in the connecting channels of the Great Lakes. Advisory
boards, which included representatives from the states and provinces
as well as federal representatives, were set up on the control of
pollution of boundary waters. These boards report to the Commission
semiannually on the extent to which the water quality objectives are
being met. These boards have had no discernible effect on the
problems of pollution of the Great Lakes.
Frederick J. E. Jordan has also examined the limits on institutional
arrangements with respect to pollution problems of joint concern to
52. D. Piper, The International Law of the Great Lakes 86 (Publication No. 30, Duke
University Commonwealth Studies Center 1967).
53. I.C.J. 54 (1946).
54. I.C.J. 55 (1948).
55. Concerning water quality objectives or standards, See Bilder, supra note 47, at 493:
The idea of recommending technical water quality objectives was a major
innovation. . .. The objectives, which were the first of their kind to be
formulated on an international basis, anticipated national action in both
countries; the concept was ultimately embodied in the [U. S.] federal Water
Quality Act of 1965 fifteen years later.
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Canada and the United States.56 He pointed out that both countries,
since World War II, have turned increasingly to the IJC as the
appropriate agency for handling transboundary pollution problems.57
Jordan identified three major limitations that are placed on the IJC in
carrying out an effective role in this area. 58 First, the treaty does not
grant the Commission specific or general jurisdiction over boundary
pollution matters. It must await a reference from the two governments, a procedure entailing delays. Second, once the Commission
has a reference, it has no power to direct or coordinate the research
for information gathering being done by domestic agencies at the
various levels of government, thus resulting in duplication of activities
and lack of communication on means and ends. Third, the Commission lacks the power to give effect to the standards and measures of
control recommended by the IJC following the completion of its
investigation. Jordan stated that this third limitation may be viewed
from two levels. First, the Commission has no powers of compulsion
on the federal government and second, it has no way of imposing its
standards on the local governments or individuals causing the
pollution. In addition, while the two federal governments may
"adopt" the Commission's recommendations, in the absence of
legislative enactments to give legal effect to them, "their implementation and enforcement remain academic." 5 9 The Commission's
powers are reduced to those of good will and persuasion.
Jordan rules out the establishment of a supranational pollution
control agency. Instead, he recommends that the two governments
vest the Commission with jurisdiction over all matters of boundary water and air pollution which were having transboundary
effects in relation both to initiating the investigation without
awaiting a reference and to coordinating the various bodies
60
involved in the study.

He also recommended that the IJC "be empowered to exercise
supervision over the implementation of its recommendations by the
users of the resource which has been the subject of the Commission's
study, and be authorized to report offenders to the federal Attorney
General of the appropriate national government with recommendations for the action to be taken." This procedure, he noted, would first
56. Jordan, Recent Developments in International Environmental Control. 15 McGill L. Rev.
279 (1969).
57. Id., at 298-299.
58. Id., at 299-300
59. Id., at 300.
60. I.,at 301
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require legislation enabling the attomies general to launch compli61
ance proceedings.
The three institutional limitations singled out by Jordan are not
significantly altered by the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The intent of the agreement is to enable both countries to
mount a more effective pollution control program for the Great
Lakes. It assigns to the Commission the principal coordinative role in
that effort. While the agreement relieves the situation on research
coordination by granting the IJC certain new authorities in that
aspect, the agreement fails to address itself to the other two
fundamental limitations, i.e., the reference requirement and lack of
enforcement authority.
The most complete and authoritative study of the entire range of
Canadian-United States relations that has appeared in recent years
was the 1965 report entitled Canadaand the United States-Principles
for Partnership,62 authored by former Ambassadors Livingston T.
Merchant of the United States and A. D. P. Heeney of Canada. 63
While the emphasis of the report is on the economic issues between
the two countries, Ambassadors Merchant and Heeney address
themselves to nearly every significant aspect of the bilateral relationship. In the section entitled, "Machinery for Consultation," the
authors consider the International Joint Commission. 64 They described the Commission as "one which has been of continuing
importance to both countries since its establishment," as a "unique
institution" with "a solid foundation of law and precedent" and as an
institution with a "long and successful record in the disposition of
problems along the boundary" which "justify consideration of some
extension of the Commission's ftinctions." 65 They accordingly recommend that the two governments "examine jointly the wisdom and
feasibility of such a development." 66
In the White House press release issued on the Merchant-Heeney
study, it was stated that the President (Lyndon B. Johnson) "believes
this report is a serious and constructive contribution to still better
relations between Canada and the United States." The statement
added that the Secretary of State is to "take the lead for the United
States in a prompt review of the report and its recommendations." 6 7
61. Id., at 301.
62. L. Merchant & A. Heeney, Canada and the United States-Principles for Partnership,
Dept. of State Bull. No.
(1965).
63. Ambassador Heeney was at the time serving as Chairman, Canadian Section of the I.J.C.;
he was in that capacity 1962-1970.
64. Paragraph No. 45.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. White House Press Release (Austin, Texas) (July 12, 1965).
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Shortly after the Merchant-Heeney report was made public, ten
Republican House members inserted into the Congressional Record
their own statement on United States-Canadian relations. 68 The
Congressmen lauded the Merchant-Heeney report as "a skillfully
written document prepared by two masters of the diplomatic art,"
but then admitted to "a perspective on United States-Canadian
relations which differs in degree from that embraced in the MerchantHeeney report." 69 The Republican statement was also extensive in
scope and well written. The commentary it contained on the IJC is of
special interest. The House members were willing to be more explicit
in sketching out a wider role for the IJC than were Ambassadors
Merchant and Heeney. Paragraph 14 of the Republican statement, for
example, began by stating that the 1909 Treaty "should be negotiated
so as to broaden the functions of the Commission." The MerchantHeeney recommendation regarding the IJC was endorsed, and the
statement was made that "it (IJC) may be the institution which can
bring new excellence in the relations between the two countries in
fields with which it is not presently authorized to deal." 70 The House
members said "We believe that expansion of the authority of the
International Joint Commission, in accordance with the following
recommendations, would enhance the capacity of the two North
American nations to establish a model of relations between independent states." 71 Among the recommendations alluded to in the
foregoing were: (1) inclusion of Lake Michigan in the definition of
boundary waters (Paragraph 15); (2) the IJC to be empowered to
make recommendations relating to continental development of water
and energy resources (Paragraph 16); (3) the IJC to constitute a
permanent institutional location for international discussion of technical foreign policy questions which arise between the two nations
(Paragraph 17); (4) the IJC studies on water level and pollution of the
Great Lakes should be given immediate priority emphasis by both
countries (Paragraph 18); and (5) the IJC should have a leading role in
fulfilling "the obvious need for comprehensive advance planning in
the development of water resources" (Paragraph 19).
Elihu Root's statements in 1913 on the continual need for the IJC
were indeed prophetic. The border complications have continued,
and the Commission still offers the only readily available machinery
for resolution. The Commission over the years has faithfully carried
68. 111 Cong. Rec. 25394(1965).
69. Reps. Tupper (Me.), Ellsworth (Kans.), Frelinghusen (N.J.), Horton (N.Y.), Mathias (Md.),
Morse (Mass.), Mosher (Ohio), Reid (N.Y.), Robison (N.Y.), and Smith (N.Y.)
70. 111 Cong. Rec. at 25397.
71. Id.
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out this unspectacular but necessary duty. It is a narrow role,
circumscribed by an instrument that reflected the limits of political
acceptability of a world that existed sixty years ago. It was not until
1972 that the Commission was authorized by the two governments to
expand its role, and even then in only one area of water resource
management.
Does the IJC have a potential role in an integrated management
scheme for the Great Lakes? The answer is probably yes. Some of the
basic questions which will have to be addressed include: (1) is the
experience gained in sixty years of an IJC a valid guide to what would
happen to an organization suddenly thrust in the limelight and
controversy of public decision making?; (2) should the IJC continue to
serve its present role, merely complementing a new agency created
especially by treaty to coordinate integrated management of the
Great Lakes?; and (3) if a new agency is charged with these
responsibilities, should it have exclusive jurisdiction or should it share
responsibility in some way with the IJC?
In the consideration of any new management scheme for the Great
Lakes, both the future role of the IJC and the IJC experience are
directly and inescapably relevant.
PART II
In its search for an improved institutional structure for water and
related land resources management in the Great Lakes Basin, the
seminar noted the various types of organizations which are either in
use or which have been proposed to carry out some public purpose
relating to the management and development of natural resources.
The existing organizational forms and some combinations thereof
were considered as to their suitability as models for an institutional
arrangement for the management of the Great Lakes. The general
consensus was that, while these organizational forms seemed, on the
whole, to be adequate for the specific purpose for which they were
established, and while some possessed advantageous features in the
context of the resource management problems of the basin, no one
form or no single readily apparent combination of them has the
required scope and capability to provide integrated resource management of the Great Lakes Basin. This conclusion is in line with Lyle E.
Craine's analysis of four different institutional forms considered as
possible models for an improved institutional structure for the U.S.
portion of the Great Lakes.72 The seminar was also in agreement with
72. L. Craine, Final Report on Institutional Arrangements for the Great Lakes 11-4 (prepared
for the Great Lakes Basin Commission 1972).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

the observation made by Craine that the deficiencies identified were
not necessarily "deficiencies in the agency form itself but rather in the
institutional system, or lack thereof, in which the agency has been
73
expected to operate."
The idea of laying out the complete set of existing organizational
forms, and then either attempting to select the optimal one or
constructing a composite institutional solution was thereupon abandoned. An altogether different course was chosen and that was to
consist of the following steps: (1) identify the full set of resource
management problems of the basin; (2) ascertain the governmental
function most appropriate for each management problem; (3) examine the public agencies in Canada and the United States established
to carry out these functions and to cope with these management
problems; and (4) determine what should be done that is not now
being done. This task completed, the general characteristics of a joint
institutional system could then be approximately determined. In
carrying through with this methodology, it was considered imperative
that the existing constitutional, political, economic and cultural
constraints operating within each country and between both countries
be recognized and "factored in" whenever appropriate and to the
extent the collective talents of the group allowed.
The resource management problems of the Great Lakes Basin that
were identified in the initial working papers and considered by the
seminar included: water quality, municipal and industrial water
supply, agricultural (irrigation) water supply, lake level control,
hydropower, flood control, navigation, shoreline protection and
development, fish and wildlife protection, water-based recreation,
solid waste disposal, air quality, urban and industrial land use,
agricultural land use, land transportation.
The seminar discussions served to help classify these resource
management problems into those which: (1) are (or should be) matters
of primary concern to a binational body and (2) require minimally:
surveillance (e.g., information collection and reporting); mediation
(e.g., development of joint programs; conflict resolution); and control
(e.g., regulatory responsibility and implementing authority). (Table 1
helps to illustrate these two classifications of the management
problems.)
In addition, the management problems of one basin (Lake Ontario)
were examined from the standpoint of the public agencies established
in the United States and Canada to deal with each of them. The
conclusion from that analysis was that there exists a definite need for
73. Id., at S-2.
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Table 1
Resource Management Problems Classification
Resource
Management
Problem
Water Quality
Municipal & Industrial
Water Supply
Agricultural Water Supply
Lake Level Control**
Hydropower
Flood Control
Navigation
Shoreline Protection &
Development
Fish & Wildlife Protection
Water-Based Recreation
Solid Waste Disposal***
Air Quality
Urban & Industrial Land Use
Agricultural Land Use
Land Transportation

Level of Binational Concern

Management Level*
Surveillance Meditation Control

Primary

X

X

X

Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Primary

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Secondary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

* It is important to note that this classification arrangement was a part of the preliminary

study in which problems clearly requiring a control program at some time in the future
would be identified. The seminar did not recommend the use of supranational control
authority by any joint Great Lakes management entity, except for water and air pollution control.
These classifications were developed as a means of organizing the information and data
available to the seminar. They provoked lively discussions and on some points there was
wide divergence of opinion. They are presented here mainly to illustrate the process of
review and discussion and are not to be taken as representing a full consensus of the
seminar.
** Lake level control is closely related to four other problem areas: hydropower, flood
control, navigation and shoreline protection and development.
*** Shoreline and other dumpings by industry and municipalities.

greater emphasis toward a more comprehensive management of the
resources of the Great Lakes region.
The study, having identified the principal resource management
problems of the basin and having examined the existing organizational forms, then turned to a review of previous research efforts on
multiple purpose resource management organization. The institutional problems associated with water and land use management have
been studied by a number of investigators in Canada and the United
States. This review of previous research provided the seminar
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participants needed perspective and insight into the current thinking
of professionals in the field.
The development of standards or criteria against which to measure
existing organizations or as a method in devising new organizations
was also considered. This is not a new concept, yet only a few writers
have attempted to construct a set of criteria that would be applicable
to an organization charged with the management of multiple purpose
use of resources in an entire region.
The review of these research efforts by "experienced practitioners
of the water management field" clearly indicated the existence of
certain common organizational criteria associated with the various
conceptual models of multiple purpose, regional management
schemes that were developed in the reports. While it is not suggested
that the set is complete, we do have confidence that the most essential
criteria are included.
The criteria are jurisdiction, enforcement powers, fiscal adequacy,
staffing adequacy, administrative discretion, flexibility, visibility,
accountability and structural compatibility.
These organizational criteria were not utilized by the seminar in
any rigid matrix like manner. A discussion of them indicated that
their utility depended greatly on too many factors. For example, it
was difficult to apply the criterion of "enforcement powers" in a
satisfactory way to all three types of management functions (surveillance, mediation or control), because the degree of enforcement power
required in these cases varied from very little to considerable. In
addition, each resource management problem of the basin requires its
own level (and here again the range is wide) of enforcement power.
Confronted with such practical difficulties, the seminar simply took
note of the criteria and utilized them mainly on a subjective basis.
In order to place the presentation that follows in better perspective, it may be helpful to review the present limits of political
feasibility of Canada-United States arrangements as they are represented in the 1972 agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality. Under that
agreement, the following new or reconfirmed responsibilities were
assigned to the International Joint Commission:
1. Collection, analysis and dissemination of data and information on Great Lakes water quality
2. Advice and recommendations to government on boundary
water pollution matters
3. Coordination assistance for joint activities undertaken pursuant to the agreement
4. Coordination assistance for Great Lakes water quality
research

January 19741

MANA GEMENT OF THE INTERNA TIONAL GREAT LAKES

5. Annual reporting to governments on program progress and
effectiveness
6. Discretionary special reports to governments and the public
on any Great Lakes water quality program
7. Discretionary authority to publish its own documentation
prepared in the discharge of its functions under the agreement
8. Authority to independently verify data and information
submitted by governments
9. Authority to establish the Great Lakes Water Quality Board
10. Authority to establish the Great Lakes Research Advisory
Board
11. Authority to establish a regional office and other subordinate bodies
The new responsibilities placed on the IJC and the domestic
agencies of both countries are significant, and if the terms of the
agreement are actually implemented by both nations a big step will
have been taken in controlling water pollution in the Great Lakes.
While these modifications to the IJC mandate are indeed significant,
important gaps still exist in these joint arrangements which limit
binational effort. For example, the Commission still lacks initiatory
authority and enforcement authority. It should be stressed also that
the new responsibilities of the Commission pertain to only one aspect
of resource management, water pollution.
Given that the 1972 agreement does represent the extent to which
the two countries are prepared to go towards institutional modifications at the present time, the seminar nevertheless proposed further
changes for consideration, in view of the rate at which real and
potential problems are building up on and around the Great Lakes.
As a result of seminar discussions which were structured in the
manner described up to this point, certain basic principles concerning
an improved institutional arrangement emerged.
First, there was broad agreement that policy affecting the resources
of the basin can no longer afford to be made on a purely domestic
basis with occasional provision for informal coordination between
Canada and the United States. The Great Lakes are large and diverse
but, perhaps most importantly, they are also binational, and this fact
requires that any proposed institutional system devised for improving
the management of the Great Lakes Basin must be bilateral in
character.
Second, and again there was no disagreement, given the complex
interrelationships existing among resource management problems,
this bilateral institutional arrangement must include the authority to
deal effectively with the entire set of resource management problems
in the basin.
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Third, an institutional arrangement implies the establishment of a
bilateral organizational structure which would carry out certain
policy, planning and management functions in the basin as agreed
upon by negotiation between the two federal governments. The way
in which these three functions are defined and assigned is crucial and
also controversial. It was at this point that opinions diverged.
Fourth, there was a general consensus that an improved institutional arrangement must in some way overcome the problem of
incongruity between political jurisdiction boundaries and natural
drainage boundaries. The seminar's preferred approach to that
problem was an institutional arrangement based on two separate but
complementary organizational components. They are: (1) a joint
basin wide policy and planning agency which is politically responsive
primarily through federal, provincial/state and citizen representation; and (2) a network of regional or lake basin management agencies
responsible for implementing the appropriate surveillance and
mediation tasks within the overall policy guidelines established by the
basin wide policy agency.There was no sharp disagreement among
seminar participants on the general concept of a two component
institutional arrangement. There was, however, difference of opinion
as to whether the emphasis should be placed on strengthened local or
regional arrangements or, alternatively, on a centralized basin wide
policy agency.
The institutional form proposed would be a joint (Canada-United
States) body intended to serve as a common source of policy guidance
and coordination for those public programs and private sector
activities which affect, to an extent which would be agreed upon
through bilateral negotiation, the water and related land and air
environments of the Great Lakes Basin. In brief, it would have a
supplemental, coordinative and catalytic role among the existing
governments and their agencies.
It is important to emphasize that the joint body considered here is
not a management entity in the sense of a regulatory and program
agency like state, provincial or federal departments and agencies with
legislative mandates. Neither is there any intention of altering the
equality status between the two countries, or of creating a supranational bureaucracy with absolute authority over the existing three
levels of government. Likewise, the organization need not displace
any existing agency of any level of government having responsibilities
for some aspect of resource management in the Great Lakes Basin.
The joint organization would carry out certain policy, planning and
management functions delegated to it by the two national governments. Policy and overall basin wide planning coordination with the
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governments of general jurisdiction and their respective agencies
would be the province of the joint Great Lakes policy agency. Basin
and regional planning as well as "management" duties would fall
primarily (but not exclusively) within the sphere of activity of the
regional resource management agencies.
The term "management" in the immediate context is defined as
encompassing two general administrative functions, those of surveillance and mediation.
"Surveillance" is defined in this instance as information gathering,
data interpretation and dissemination. It is a function concerned with
problem identification and definition. It would require a continuing
responsibility to be aware of current and developing problems in the
whole Great Lakes Basin.
"Mediation" is viewed as the administrative function going beyond
that of surveillance in terms of authority and responsibility. It is an
active role in which joint activities are agreed upon and conflicts are
resolved through discussion and consultation. It is envisaged that the
joint body being proposed would be actively involved in a coordinative and mediative capacity with the operating agencies in developing joint programs to attack common problems within the basin. This
role could include, among other things, promulgation (after appropriate coordination with the agencies concerned) of regulations,
standards and compliance schedules. While the joint body, under the
definition and recommendations of this report, would have no
enforcement authority of its own, such promulgations would provide
clear evidence of acceptance of common goals and agreement on joint
programs. The public notice of these actions would be a large step
forward in securing public credibility, improving government accountability and providing public reports for public assessment of progress.
While its initial basic administrative functions would be those of
surveillance and mediation, the two national governments may at
some stage consider vesting the joint agency with a specific enforcement role in the case of certain resource management problems, e.g.,
water pollution and air pollution.
The joint agency could not carry out an effective mediation role
under the present form of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Changes
are required to allow the joint agency to operate (within carefully
negotiated limits to be established by the two countries) without the
restrictions that the reference procedure now imposes. The national
reference requirements vitiate the anticipatory and initiatory actions
that are essential to both planning and meditation.
The agency must have the flexibility needed to anticipate future
problems of the basin, to help plan for them and to assist in the
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coordination of programs designed to ameliorate them. The agency
should have a planning staff adequate enough in size to provide it
with expert advice on planning matters. Also, the agency must have
sufficient fiscal and supervisory control over any planning activities it
itself undertakes or it sponsors.
This completes the discussion of the general specification of a Great
Lakes management organization. The next section develops the viable
institutional alternatives identified by the seminar.
In developing the characteristics of a binational body with the
surveillance and mediation functions envisaged by the seminar, two
alternative approaches were identified and accepted by the group as a
whole as representing the most viable options presently available.
Both would require a considerable strengthening of cooperative
relationships at local and regional levels to achieve the desirable
degree of decentralized decision making and public support.
The first alternative would seek to improve management of the
resources of the Great Lakes by introducing organizational improvements within the framework of a significantly strengthened International Joint Commission. The functions of the IJC would be significantly broadened with respect to the Great Lakes Basin. The scope
of its jurisdiction over the water and the related land resources of the
basin would be extended commensurate with the new management
functions assigned to it by negotiation between the United States and
Canada. The IJC would be granted the necessary policy making and
administrative authority to enable it to carry out its assigned
coordinative role. The IJC would be freed from the present treaty
constraint of acting only when a matter is referred to by both
countries, and it would assume an active role in the public decisionmaking processes through its mediation function. The number of
commissioners as well as the present appointment criteria and
procedures might require modification, but this is left to the bilateral
negotiations. The IJC would be authorized a binational, full time
secretariat that would carry out its functions at some mutually agreed
upon permanent location in the Great Lakes Basin. The IJC would be
authorized to establish subordinate offices at the basin or sub-basin
level to the extent it deems appropriate. The relationship of the IJC
to the court systems of both countries would be a major question to be
included in the bilateral negotiations. The IJC should be empowered
to hold hearings on all matters within its purview.
Concerning a planning role, the IJC would facilitate planning on a
joint basis, using as guides the Great Lakes Basin Commission (GLBC)
established pursuant to the U. S. Water Resources Planning Act of
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196574 and the programs of coordinated planning carried out by
arrangements between the Provinces and the Federal Government of
Canada such as those possible under the Canada Water Act of 1970. 75
This means that the IJC would be authorized by treaty to serve as the
principal agency for assuring the coordination of federal, state/provincial, interstate, local and nongovernmental plans for the development of water and related land resources within the Great Lakes
Basin. Through its enhanced surveillance and mediation functions, it
would also recommend long range schedules of priorities for the
collection and analysis of basic data and for investigation, planning
and construction of projects. It would carry out any other planning
functions to which both national governments may agree.
One of the major functions of a strengthened IJC would be
coordination of ongoing research and research planning pertaining to
the Great Lakes Basin. This does not imply an in house research
capability for the IJC, however. The objective here is primarily to
minimize duplication of research work and to identify gaps in the
overall research effort.
Finally, the coordinative and catalytic role envisioned for the IJC
implies a continuous and close relationship with the existing governments and their agencies having responsibilities in the Great Lakes
Basin. It draws its political responsiveness from the fact that it would
continue to be ultimately accountable to the Department of State and
the Department of External Affairs. The provision for state/provincial
and citizen representation would further ensure political responsiveness and accountability. Its authority would derive from a treaty,
and this legal basis should be extended so that it is rooted ultimately
in the laws of all the governments of general jurisdiction within the
Great Lakes Basin.
The second alternative would seek the same objective by establishing by treaty new organizational arrangements which would be
distinct from the International Joint Commission. The Columbia
River Treaty would provide a precedent. The second alternative
differs from the first in that a specially created, international body
supplants the IJC in the Great Lakes Basin. The IJC is relieved of its
treaty responsibilities within the basin and the functions of the
existing permanent and temporary Great Lakes boards are absorbed
by the new treaty established body. The responsibility of the IJC for
that portion of the international border lying outside the Great Lakes
Basin would remain unaffected. The second alternative would require
74. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, Stat. (1965).
75. Canada Water Act of 1970, Can. Stat. c.52 (1969-1970).
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the negotiation of a new treaty by Canada and the United States as
well as modifications to the 1909 treaty. The principal advantage of
this second approach is that it gives policy makers of both countries
the opportunity to build "from the ground up" a joint agency
specifically designed to improve the management of the water and
related land resources of the basin.
The functions of this newly created body would be, for this level of
generalization, identical to those postulated in the first alternative.
To be fully effective, both alternatives above have to be based on
strengthened cooperation among the array of Canadian and U.S.
agencies having responsibilities in the Great Lakes Basin. Besides
developing a binational policy with surveillance and mediation
functions, attention has also to be given to achieving more intensive
regional (or sub-basin) collaboration in ways which put the binational
body into an effective working relationship with the politicallyresponsive agencies at the municipal and state/provincial level.
One approach to this is to see that "opposite number" agencies at
sub-basin and special problem area levels within the Great Lakes
Basin have and use wide authority to collaborate with one another in
a transborder manner in an array of management questions (while at
the same time preserving clear cut lines of political responsibility for
policy-making in both countries). This is only to recognize that there
is an inseparable relationship between planning for water management and pollution control, planning for community growth and
renewal, and planning for the future development of industry,
agriculture and other resource uses within the basin. This complexity
has to be recognized and cannot be dealt with exclusively by
strengthening centrally created organizations such as the joint policy
coordination body called for in the two alternatives above.
In summary, the alternatives recommended imply or provide for:
-Establishing

a joint Canadian-United States management

body for the Great Lakes having surveillance and mediation
functions;

-Joint agency budget and administrative procedures;
-Initiatory authority for such matters as planning, surveys,
investigations and research under carefully specified guidelines
established by the two countries;
-Program responsiveness by requiring that the activities of the

joint management body be subject to program and budget
authorization and review on, for example, a biannual basis;

-Facilitating joint planning on a multiple purpose basis;
-Stressing

intensive regional and transborder collaboration

among state/provincial and local governments;
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-Developing a more comprehensive and systematic approach
to the management of the Great Lakes;
-Joint information collection and analysis; and
-Public reporting.
The alternatives recommended do not providefor:
-Changing the equality status of the two countries in matters
concerning Great Lakes management;
-Establishing a supranational decision making authority;

-Changing the basic authority of existing national, provincial,
or state responsibilities; nor
-Displacing existing agencies.
It will be observed that these approaches to institutional change
have not been developed in full, the omission of detail being
deliberate. The general feeling among the Canadian-United States
faculty group was that if the seminar could succeed in identifying the
most viable alternatives available and could also, with some degree of
confidence, indicate their general specifications, then the time and
effort expended on the exercise by everyone was well employed.
Moving for the moment beyond the context of the immediate study,
the participating faculty members as a group were most concerned
about the fundamental question that has to do with the general
attitude of the governments of Canada and of the United States on the
multiple purpose management of the Great Lakes Basin. It is not
clear whether or not the two governments believe that the problems
emerging in and around the Great Lakes are inexorably leading to
critical situations and that it is imperative to initiate now concerted
action in order to conserve and enhance these unique resources for
the present and future generations. There should be little doubt that
the pollution problem is already critical. Can the two countries afford
again to wait for other crises to occur as a prerequisite to action?
The major question is the willingness of both countries to exercise
their political will at least to the extent of strengthening their ability
to resolve existing difficulties and to be better prepared for future
problems. Some members of the academic community of the region in
both Canada and the United States have demonstrated their readiness
to play a supportive role in this endeavor.
If the seminar has accomplished little else, it should serve to open
up debate on the whole Great Lakes question. In the event the
response from the two governments for further efforts is positive in
tone, they will find that some groundwork has been prepared for them
and that the Canadian and U.S. universities around the Great Lakes
Basin are in a position to lend added structure to the debate.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The governments of the United States and Canada should
initiate, on a joint basis, a comprehensive examination of the
problems associated with multiple purpose management of the Great
Lakes in order to conserve, develop and use that unique resource for
the mutual benefit of the people of both countries.
B. The alternative proposals formulated by the Canada-United
States University Seminar should be used by the two governments as a
basis for initiating discussion and debate on the modernization of the
management of the Great Lakes.
C. In the United States, a study bill should be introduced early in
the 93rd Congress for the purpose of opening the doors to serious
public debate on the question of the joint management of the Great
Lakes Basin by local, state, regional and federal officials and private
persons and non-governmental organizations concerned with the
public interest.
D. In Canada, the findings of the seminar should be discussed with
officials in the federal government, the Ontario provincial government and selected regional and local governments in Ontario. The
purpose would be to encourage informal federal-provincial-regionallocal consultations on the new steps and responsibilities needed for
the Great Lakes Basin, with a view to developing more detailed
proposals for consideration at the cabinet level of the two senior
governments and providing material for bilateral consultations.

